An Analysis of the CSIS Report on the Invasion of Taiwan

An Analysis of the CSIS Report on the Invasion of Taiwan

  

  By: Marco Dorazio:  1/31/2022



Recently, the CSIS (Center for Strategic & International Studies) published a report on a hypothetical invasion of Taiwan by China. This was one of the first reports where analysts found that the US and Taiwan could jointly defend Taiwan from an amphibious invasion of the Island. I wanted to write an article about this a while ago, but I never had the time so I’ll give you it now.


The report found that China is unlikely to succeed in an invasion of Taiwan after 24 computer simulations of such an invasion. These simulations included many different scenarios and restrictions on the capabilities of each side. 


For the base scenario, the researchers found that China was unable to capture major cities and was out of supply in the first 10 days. Importantly, in all base scenario simulations, China loses at least 90 percent of the Chinese amphibious fleet forcing the units onshore to only be supported by airdrops of heliborne supplies. Even with a sound strategy, China was unable to capture more than 7% of Taiwan's shoreline. In total, only 2,600 square kilometers were captured. 


In all scenarios, the simulation only ran for 3-4 weeks. Some will argue that this doesn't represent the scale of the war, but as described in the article, all major events and turning points in the war will happen within the first 3 weeks. But this entire conflict to come to a conclusion could take months. 


The US lost between 161-372 aircraft and 43 ships. Although note that about 90% of aircraft losses were destroyed on the ground. This is because the US has a lack of air force bases in the range of Taiwan. The ships lost included two aircraft carriers and about 7-20 larger surface vessels. Chinese losses were 155 planes and 138 ships. Overall Chinese losses were higher, suffering an average of 7 battalions lost or about 7,000 soldiers. Another 15,000 were lost at sea and another 30,000 would most likely be taken, prisoner. 


The base scenario ranked as a U.S/Coalition Victory.   






For the optimistic scenario, the positioning had to have four things. The US had to have increased access to Dual-Use facilities in Japan. China had to be more conservative with the usage of missiles, and the US had to have little to no bomber or aircraft carrier presence around China. It also simulated Japan authorizing force within the first week of the invasion, and that U.S. 5th generation aircraft and pilot training was superior to China’s. 


If these factors can become a reality. The outcome of the invasion could be changed dramatically. China would suffer disastrous defeats and would be unable to land more than 3 combat battalions in Taiwan before losing a critical amount of troop transports and ships. The rest would have to be dropped from the plane. The total amount averaged to about 25 battalions, but the total land taken would be less than 780 square kilometers. Which is about the size of NYC. 

In this scenario, US losses were much less than China’s. In the first days of the conflict, China, in hope of retaliating against light aircraft losses over China, used over 70% of its LRBMs to take out around 250 U.S. aircraft, again these aircraft were stationary on the ground. 


The Chinese invasion force, due to the lack of supply ships and air superiority, was unable to resupply and rendered combat ineffective. Out of the battalions landed, there would be 3,000 Chinese losses, with losses being twice as high for the Taiwanese defenders. This was mostly due to Chinese aircraft conducting ground support operations. 


The only scenario where Taiwan and its Coalition fail to get some sort of overall victory was in a scenario where Taiwan stood alone. If Taiwan gets no outside help, then the entire island would be under Chinese control within three months. The Chinese would still lose 70,000 men, but this would be disastrous for the US and the global economy as a whole. In a scenario where China was able to pull off a win against a Taiwanese coalition a couple of factors had to be in their favor. We should avoid these factors if possible. To start, Japan would remain completely neutral and would not allow US forces to operate from their territory. China would also have to negate any U.S. bomber presence. This would be very hard to do because China does not possess any kind of ground attack missile that would hit US bases with bombers. And so, the only way China would be able to destroy these bombers is with some kind of hypothetical extreme-range SAM or air-to-air missile that would pick off the bombers over the curvature of the earth. China could also not worry about this problem if the US fails to procure enough ASCMs (Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles). 


This scenario shows the importance of two factors. The US must be able to base its troops in Japan and also must have an ample stock of ASCMs to attack China with. Finally, the US and Asian allies must get involved within the first week of the war directly. 


The reason these results came with so much shock was because of two things. One, that the US media likes to fearmonger and two, that this simulation contradicts some of the longer-length simulations from the DoD. This simulation used a different modeling method than those simulations from the DoD. The DoD is at fault here, invasions are difficult to model with the Method of PₖS. But government organizations tend to favor this kind of modeling because it results in more data-rich information. But it leads the simulation to overestimate how fast waterborne invasions can take. They also only have the capabilities to simulate the first couple of days of a conflict, which can be misleading, and much harder to draw a definite outcome from such a short amount of data. Researchers might have also overestimated the capabilities of Chinese equipment while decrementing the abilities of US equipment due to known drawbacks. For example, a DoD simulation included one where China was given some super alien technology or a boost in various different factors like morale or technological superiority. 


Examples of this drawback can be seen in the DoDs simulation of the 1991 invasion of Iraq. Where simulations predicted US casualties to be many times higher than they actually were. Or for a more recent example. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine was a war game with a decisive and quick victory for Russia. But, those simulations clearly did not accurately reflect the capabilities of a potential Russian adversary. The DoD did not want to underestimate the threat.


This is why these simulations can only account for so much. In real life, conflicts cannot be perfectly explained through mathematical equations. Things like crew incompetency or data that is not reported by countries like China and Russia can simply not be taken into account. 


If the US wants to increase the odds of winning a conflict over Taiwan there are a number of things we should do. To start, we should invest in deepening our ties with Japan. The current “Status of Forces Agreement” between the US and Japan refers to a requirement for “consultation” between countries. Some Japanese lawmakers interpret this vague law as requiring the US to obtain permission before flying combat missions. But the U.S. sees this as simply a notification to Japan of US intentions. We should try to fix this disconnect as soon as possible because it could cause serious unintended consequences if this war becomes a reality. 


The US must also be very straightforward and responsively decisive with its reaction to an invasion of Taiwan. The longer the US delays entry into the war, the more bloodshed will occur. The US should also not attack the Chinese mainland, this risks severe escalations in the war. If necessary, targets should only include OTH radar, satellite uplink stations, and the Chinese Air Force. We should also arm Taiwan as we did Ukraine. We should supply them with weapons for Asymmetrical warfare. In a one-on-one fight, Taiwan cannot withstand a Chinese invasion. Investing in equipment like anti-tank and anti-ship weapons will be crucial for the Taiwanese to pull off a victory. 


And even if we win the war; we must be careful not to slip into a realm of disillusionment. With the sudden shock of many many service members dying for Taiwan, many people may begin to question why the US would defend Taiwan. Some may want to push the war further and invade China. Oppositely, we may have an isolationist response to these losses. Similar to after World War One, we may withdraw ourselves from the global arena but I doubt this. 



If you want to read the full report, it can be found here: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?VersionId=WdEUwJYWIySMPIr3ivhFolxC_gZQuSOQ





















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